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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model of a production economy which has a
risky production technology as well as a growth option to expand the scale of the
productive sector of the economy. We show that when confronted with growth
options, the representative consumer may sharply alter consumption rates to im-
prove the likelihood of investment. This reduction in consumption is accompanied
by an erosion of the option value of waiting to invest, leading to investment near
the zero NPV threshold. It also has important consequences for the evolution of
risk aversion, asset prices and equilibrium interest rates which we characterize in
this paper. One interesting prediction of the model is that we get time varying
risk aversion and equity returns by virtue of the presence of growth option. We
also ﬁnd that the moneyness of the growth option is the key factor which deter-
mines the extent to which the book to market ratios will inﬂuence the conditional
moments of equity returns.
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This paper develops a framework to examine the exercise of growth options in general
equilibrium. This framework is then used to derive implications regarding asset pric-
ing quantities such as the equity risk premium. We construct a single good, general
equilibrium model of an economy with a production technology that exhibits linear,
stochastic constant returns to scale. This technology may be thought of as assets in
place. The representative consumer can expand the scale of the production technology
by investing an amount of the only good in the economy at any time. This is naturally
interpreted as a growth option. We show that when confronted with growth option, the
representative consumer may sharply alter consumption rates to improve the likelihood
of investment. This reduction in consumption is accompanied by a fall in risk aversion
in wealth and an erosion of the option value of waiting to invest. It also generates
time-varying equilibrium interest rates and a countercyclical equity risk premium.
Equilibrium asset pricing in exchange economies with a representative consumer
can be traced back to the papers of Lucas (1978) and Rubinstein (1976). Asset pricing
models with production economies have been developed by a number of authors includ-
ing Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (CIR, 1985), Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Jermann
(1998). One of the diﬃculties with production economies is that the consumer is able
to use the production technologies to smooth his consumption to a point that these
models have diﬃculty in generating suﬃcient movements in the pricing kernel. Ad-
justment costs, time to build, and other enhancements have been explored by authors
to overcome this diﬃculty. One way in which lumpy investments in production arises
is through the growth options that economies often have. Recent examples of such
growth options include the internet boom, ﬁber optic networks and communication
technologies and bio-tech investments. Such growth options may not only signiﬁcantly
expand the scale of the economy but also the risk-return character of the economy.
They require lump sum investments. This is the avenue that we pursue in this paper.
In the real options literature such lump sum investments in irreversible production
technologies have been investigated [see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a survey of early
real options models]. But these papers typically consider situations in which the exer-
cise of real options does not aﬀect equilibrium quantities such as consumption, asset
prices, and interest rates. As a result, our model can be contrasted with the approaches
1in this literature along the following dimensions:
1. In most real options models agents are risk neutral and maximize the discounted
expected payoﬀ of the real option. In our model, the decision maker is risk averse
and maximizes the discounted expected life-time utility of consumption.
2. In option pricing theory, the dividend [consumption] policy is either exogenous
or implicitly assumed away. In our framework the stream of dividends or con-
sumption is endogenously determined. The investor must optimally select the
sequence of consumption to implement an exercise policy that maximizes his life-
time discounted expected utility. Because the optimal consumption and exercise
policies depend on the scale of the project, the homogeneity property of standard
option pricing models does not apply in our setup: doubling the strike price and
the stock price does not double the option value.
3. In standard real options models, real options are redundant and do not aﬀect the
demand and supply of assets in the economy. In our framework, the presence of
growth options has important consequences for asset pricing quantities such as
equilibrium interest rates or the equity risk premium. One interesting prediction
of the model is that we get time varying risk aversion and equity returns by
virtue of the presence of growth option — the model produces a countercyclical
risk aversion and a countercyclical equity risk premium. This comes from the
production side of the economy as opposed to models in which habit formation
produces time varying risk aversion to explain aggregate stock market behavior.
A number of authors have laid the foundations to link asset pricing with the pres-
ence of growth options in the economy. Notable contributions include Cochrane (1991,
1996), Berk, Green and Naik (1999), Kogan (2001), Wang (2001), Gomes, Kogan and
Zhang (2003), and Cooper (2004).1 Our focus as well as the modeling approach diﬀer
from these earlier contributions. While most of these papers examine the cross sec-
tion of returns, our focus is on the equity risk premium. Moreover, we consider an
1The paper that is most closely related to our analysis is Wang (2001). Wang builds a general equi-
librium model where there are opportunities to adopt new technologies. While his paper provides some
characteristics of the resulting equilibrium, the value-maximizing policies are not derived explicitly.
Hence, it is diﬃcult to gauge the eﬀects of growth options on asset pricing quantities.
2investment problem in which the economy has a simple (endogenous) structural break:
The economy begins with a live growth option, but once it is optimally exercised it
reverts to a “Robinson Crusoe” economy similar to CIR. One essential implication of
this assumption is that we can get a closed-form solution for the optimization problem
of the representative consumer. As a result, we can clearly distinguish our explanation
for time-varying returns from competing explanations such as habit formation. In par-
ticular, our solution allows us to examine optimal exercise strategies in much greater
detail and study how the feedback eﬀects on equilibrium quantities inﬂuence optimal
exercise. In addition, it allows us to explicitly link the role played by consumption in
the exercise of growth options and hence on asset pricing.
At a basic level, the introduction of growth options is natural in production-based
models of asset pricing. Economic intuition suggests that the consumer, when con-
f r o n t e dw i t hg r o w t ho p t i o n s ,m a ys h a r p l ya lter consumption rates to optimally exer-
cise the growth option. This implies that the sensitivity of the consumption rate to
wealth may be qualitatively diﬀerent in economies with growth options than conven-
tional models might suggest. This property will have a corresponding consequence
for the evolution of risk aversion, asset prices and equilibrium interest rates which we
characterize in this paper. In particular, because the value of the option depends on
the endogenous time-varying consumption policy, the model generates a time-varying
equity risk premium. We also ﬁnd that signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in moments of equity
returns are predicted when the growth options are near the money. Speciﬁcally, the
moneyness of the growth option is the key factor which determines the extent to which
the book to market ratios will inﬂuence the conditional moments of equity returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the base-
line model of growth options. Section 3 develops the general equilibrium framework.
Section 4 characterizes the endogenous level of the stock of good at which the option
is exercised by the representative consumer. This trigger policy and its connection
to optimal consumption are also addressed in section 4. Section 5 develops a com-
plete characterization of asset prices in the economy. Section 6 concludes. Technical
developments are gathered in the Appendix.
32 Benchmark model of real options
2.1 The basic setup
We begin by reviewing a standard model of real options in the spirit of McDonald
and Siegel (1986). This will allow us to illustrate more clearly how the exercise of the
growth option and asset pricing quantities interact in a general equilibrium framework.
2.1.1. Information structure.
We consider an inﬁnite horizon production economy in continuous time. Uncertainty is
represented by a probability space (Ω,F,F,P) on which is deﬁned a standard Brownian
motion Z.T h eﬁltration F is the usual augmentation of the ﬁltration generated by the
Brownian motion and we let F := ∪t≥0Ft so that the true state of nature is solely
determined by the path of the Brownian motion. All processes are adapted to the
ﬁltration F and all statements involving random quantities hold either almost surely or
almost everywhere depending on the context.
2.1.2. Production technology.
We consider a ﬁrm using a risky production technology that exhibits linear, stochastic
constant returns to scale. At any time t,t h eﬁrm’s instantaneous cash ﬂow is given by
δWt where δ is a strictly positive constant representing the rate at which dividends are
paid and W is the non negative process deﬁned by:2
dWt =( µ − δ)Wtdt + σWtdZt,W 0 > 0, (1)
where the instantaneous expected rate of return µ and volatility σ>0 are exogenous
constants. Below, we interpret W as the capital stock available to the ﬁrm.
2.1.3. Growth option.
At any time t,t h es t o c ko fc a p i t a lc a nb ee x p a n d e db yaf a c t o rα>1. Investment
is irreversible and generates a net payoﬀ (α − 1)W − I,w h e r eI>0 is a sunk cost
that may be due to adjustment costs, learning by doing, or any other type of friction.
Because the stock of capital is a suﬃcient statistic for the payoﬀ from investment and
this payoﬀ is increasing in W, the optimal investment policy can be described by the
ﬁrst passage time of the process W to a constant threshold wi.
2We assume here an exogenous constant dividend yield. Later, in a general equilibrium setting, the
consumer will choose optimally the consumption (dividend) policy.
42.2 Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment
Firms in our economy own the production technology and one growth option to expand
their stock of capital. As a result, ﬁrm value is equal to the value of assets in place plus
the value of the growth option. Assume that the investor is risk neutral and denote his









ρ − µ + δ
Wt = ΠWt. (2)
Consider next the value of the growth option. At the time τ of investment the stock
of capital is increased by a factor α. As a result, the payoﬀ from exercising the growth
option is G(Wτ): =( α − 1)ΠWτ − I and we can write ﬁrm value as:







where S denotes the set of F−stopping times, τ is the random time of investment, and
the second term on the right hand side accounts for the value of the growth option.
Standard calculations give:





,W 0 <w , (4)
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− (µ − δ). (6)
Equation (4) shows that ﬁrm value equals the value of assets in place plus the
value of the growth option. The value of the growth option equals the product of
the investment surplus [(α − 1)Πwi − I] and a stochastic discount factor [(wi/W)
−β].
This discount factor accounts for both the timing of investment and the probability of
investment, and captures the state contingent nature of the model. Equation (5) gives
the optimal investment rule, that is the critical value wi a tw h i c hi tw i l lb eo p t i m a lt o
invest. Because β>1,w eh a v e(α − 1)Πwi >I . Thus, irreversibility and the ability
5to delay lead to a range of inaction even when the net present value of the project is
positive. The relative size of this region of inaction only depends on
β
β−1: whether the




Πwi will still be the same.
This homogeneity property, or scale independence, of the optimal investment policy is
well known in the literature, see Hubbard (1994).
A ss h o w nb ye q u a t i o n( 5 ) ,t h ei n v e s t m e n tthreshold depends on the parameters
of the production technology, the subjective discount rate ρ,a n dt h ep a y o u tr a t eδ.
Notably, wi increases with σ and decreases with ρ and δ. In this benchmark model, any
dividend payout is exogenous. Hence, the investment threshold and the value of the ﬁrm
only depend on the dividend payout policy through the exogenous payout rate δ.W h e n
the subjective discount rate is high enough, the consumer prefers a positive dividend
payout. Dividends increase the value derived from current consumption, but reduce
the value of the growth option. This tension, in an equilibrium model, determines the
optimal payout policy endogenously.
We have so far sketched out the trade-oﬀs between current consumption and the
exercise of growth options without enforcing any equilibrium requirements. In the
rest of the paper, we focus on a general equilibrium setting where the representative
consumer chooses both the payout policy and the exercise time of the growth option
so as to maximize his lifetime expected utility of consumption. The focus is then on
the manner in which these decisions may inﬂuence equilibrium quantities.
3 The equilibrium model
In this section we extend the analysis to consider a single good production economy
with a representative consumer. To do so, we ﬁrst present the assumptions underlying
the equilibrium model. We then review the solution provided by Cox, Ingersoll and
Ross (1985) to the consumer’s optimization problem in the absence of growth options.
3.1 The economy
3.1.1. Investment opportunities.
There is a single consumption good which is taken as a numéraire and we assume that
there are two investment opportunities available to the representative consumer.
6The ﬁrst investment opportunity is a locally risk-free bond which pays no dividends.
We denote its price process by B and assume that
dBt = Bt (rtdt + dLt),B 0 =1
for some instantaneous rate of return r and some singularly continuous process L which
are to be determined endogenously in equilibrium. As in other equilibrium models
of investment, see for example Casassus, Collin-Dufresne and Routledge (2004), the
presence of a singular component in the equilibrium price is necessary to account for
the singularity induced by the exercise of the growth option.
The second investment opportunity is a risky production technology whose output
is the consumption good. As before, this technology exhibits linear returns to scale
and the dynamics of its instantaneous return are given by
dSt = St (µdt + σdZt),S 0 > 0. (7)
where the instantaneous expected rate of return µ and instantaneous volatility σ>0
are exogenous constants. In addition to these two investment opportunities, we assume
that the representative consumer can invest I units of the consumption good to expand
the scale of the production technology by a constant factor α>1.
3.1.2. Consumption and investment plans.
Trading takes place continuously and there are no market frictions. A consumption and
investment plan is a triple (c,π,τ) where c is a non negative process representing the
agent’s rate of consumption, π is a process representing the amount of capital invested
in the production technology and τ is a stopping time representing the exercise time
of the growth option.
Assume that the consumer follows an arbitrary consumption and investment plan
and denote by W the corresponding wealth process. Since the consumer’s actions must
be self ﬁnancing, W − π is invested in the risk-free security. Moreover, the exercise
of the growth option at the stopping time τ induces the consumer’s wealth process to
jump by the amount





=( α − 1)πτ − I.
7As a result, the dynamics of the consumer’s wealth are given by















csds +1 {t>τ}∆(πτ). (8)
Throughout the paper, we say that a consumption and exercise plan (c,τ) is feasible if
there exists π such that the corresponding solution to the above equation is well deﬁned
and non negative. As shown by Dybvig and Huang (1989), this restriction is suﬃcient
to rule out arbitrage opportunities from the market.
3.1.3. Preferences, endowments and equilibrium.
The agent is endowed with an initial wealth W0 > 0 and has exclusive access to
the risky production technology and the ensuing growth option. His preferences over















where 1 6= R>0 is the consumer’s constant relative risk aversion and ρ ≥ 0 is his
subjective rate of time preference. While most of our results hold for general utility
functions satisfying the Inada conditions, we focus on this simple speciﬁcation of the
model because it allows us to obtain explicit results in some cases of interest and has
been widely used in asset pricing.
An equilibrium for our production economyw i t hg r o w t ho p t i o ni sr e a c h e di ft h e
bond price process is such that the representative consumer optimally invests all of his
wealth into the production technology and nothing in the riskless asset. More formally,
we will use the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium for the above economy is a stopping time τ∗ ∈ S and a
collection of stochastic processes (B,W,c∗,π∗) such that
a) Given the bond price process, the pair (c∗,τ∗) maximizes the lifetime utility of the
representative consumer over the set of feasible plans and is ﬁnanced by π∗.
b) The process W solves equation (8) given (c∗,π∗,τ∗), the bond price process and
t h ei n i t i a ls t o c ko fg o o d si nt h ee c o n o m y .
c) The markets for the riskless asset and the production technology clear in the sense
that π∗ = W holds at all times.
83.2 The benchmark equilibrium: CIR (1985)
Set α =1and I =0so that the consumer’s wealth becomes independent of the growth
option. In this case, our economy collapses to a simple version of the Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1985) economy. For the purpose of comparison, and in order to facilitate
the analysis of later sections, we now brieﬂy review some of their results.
Under the assumptions about preferences and technology set forth above, a unique
equilibrium exists in this production economy without growth options if and only if the













is strictly positive. Under this parametric restriction, which merely requires the rate of
time preference to be high enough, the bond price process is continuous, the equilibrium
interest rate is
r0
t = r0 := µ − σ2R, (11)
and the representative consumer’s optimal consumption policy is given by
c0
t = c0(Wt): =ΛWt. (12)
The lifetime utility of the representative consumer can also be computed explicitly.
Speciﬁcally, plugging the optimal consumption policy deﬁned above into equation (9)
and computing the conditional expectation we ﬁnd
V0(W0): =U0(Λ)U(W0). (13)
When there are many risky technologies, the CIR (1985) model gives very similar
conclusions: The risk-free rate is still a constant and the functional forms of the optimal
consumption and the value function are still the same with the exception that the
drift and the volatility parameters will now reﬂect the weighted drifts and weighted
covariances of the outputs from the diﬀerent technologies.
The above equilibrium not only serves as a benchmark for our economy with growth
options, it also gives the boundary condition for computing the equilibrium of our
model. Indeed, once the growth option is exercised our economy again collapses to
that of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) and hence admits a unique equilibrium similar
to the one described above.
94 The central planner’s problem
This section formulates the central planner’s problem, that is the choice of an optimal
consumption plan and an optimal investment time given that the market clears.
4.1 Formulation
In equilibrium, the representative consumer optimally invests all his wealth in the
production technology. His dynamic budget constraint can thus be written as
Wt = W0 +
Z t
0
Ws (µds + σdZs) −
Z t
0
csds +1 {t>τ}∆(Wτ). (14)
The central planner’s problem consists in maximizing the lifetime utility subject to
the non negativity constraint and the above dynamic budget constraint. In order to
facilitate the presentation of our result, let Θ denote the set of admissible plans, that







and the corresponding solution to (14) is non negative throughout the inﬁnite horizon.
With this notation, the value function of the central planner is








The following lemma provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the parameters
of the model for this problem to be well deﬁned.
Lemma 1 The central planner’s value function is ﬁnite if and only the marginal
propensity to consume from wealth Λ is strictly positive.
4.2 The optimal policy
Once the growth option is exercised, the central planner optimally follows the con-
sumption plan prescribed by equation (12). Hence, his value function at the exercise
time of the growth option is given by
V1(Wτ): =V0 (αWτ − I),
10where V0 is the value function absent growth option deﬁned in (13). An application of
the dynamic programming principle, which is justiﬁed in Appendix A, then yields










and it follows that we can from now on focus on the determination of the optimal
exercise time and the optimal consumption plan prior to exercise.
In order to provide the intuition behind our main results, we start by providing
a heuristic description of the solution. Since the representative consumer can always
decide to postpone indeﬁnitely the exercise of the growth option, we have
V0(w) ≤ V (w),w ∈ (0,∞),
where V0 is deﬁned in (13). In order to provide a diﬀerential characterization of the
value function, consider ﬁrst that it is strictly suboptimal to exercise the growth option
over the interval [t,t + ε]. In this situation, it follows from the deﬁnition of the value
function and the dynamic programming principle that








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Ft
¸
where Wt+δ is the central planner’s wealth at time t + δ determined according to the
stochastic diﬀerential equation (14). In diﬀerential form, this implies that the value
function must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation DV =0where the second




ρV − µwV 0 −
1
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σ2w2V 00 − U(c)+cV 0
¾
. (16)
In accordance with the literature on optimal stopping problems, we refer to the set of
points w ∈ (0,∞) such that V (w) >V 1(w) as the continuation region.
Consider next a situation where the central planner’s wealth at time t is such that
it is optimal to exercise the growth option immediately. In this case,
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¸
.
The ﬁrst inequality states that immediate investment is optimal. Furthermore, under
the optimal policy strict inequality is impossible since the central planner is free to
11exercise the option instantaneously. Thus, the ﬁrst inequality is always satisﬁed as an
equality and V (Wt)=V1 (Wt) in the exercise region. The second inequality captures
the fact that the central planner can always postpone investment, but currently ﬁnds
this to be strictly suboptimal. In diﬀerential form, this second inequality implies that
we must have DV> 0 i nt h ee x e r c i s er e g i o n .
Putting together the diﬀerent conditions stated above, we obtain a single variational
inequality to be satisﬁed by the value function
min{V (w) − V1(w),V(w) − V0(w),DV (w)} =0 ,w ∈ (0,∞). (17)
This equation shows that in our model the central planner’s value function must lie
above the obstacle





and that the state space of the problem can be divided into three regions. Speciﬁcally,
we expect that there exists two constant wealth levels wc and wi such that:
1. If the central planner’s wealth belongs to the set B0 := (0,w c] then it is suboptimal
to curtail current consumption in order the favor the exercise of the growth option
and future consumption. As a result, the optimal consumption plan is not aﬀected
by the growth option in the sense that
c(Wt)=c0(Wt)=( V 0
0(Wt))− 1
R = ΛWt. (18)
Furthermore, it is not optimal to exercise the growth option and the value function
of the representative consumer satisﬁes V = V0.
2. If the central planner’s wealth belongs to C := (wc,w i), then it is optimal to
reduce current consumption in order to increase the likelihood of exercise. Over
this region, the value function lies strictly above the obstacle V∗(w) and satisﬁes







and the exercise of the growth option occurs as soon as the central planner’s
wealth reaches the constant investment threshold wi.
123. If the central planner’s wealth belongs to B1 := [wi,∞), then it is optimal to
exercise the growth option immediately. In this case, the value function satisﬁes
V = V1 and the optimal consumption policy after investment is given by (18).
The continuation region of the problem is thus given by B0 ∪ C =( 0 ,w i) while the
exercise region is given by B1 =( wi,∞). Finally, we expect the value function to be
smooth almost everywhere except possibly at the investment threshold and to satisfy
the smooth pasting condition
lim
w↑wi





on the common boundary of the continuation and exercise regions. The decomposition
of the state space described above and the expected shape of the central planner’s value
function are illustrated in the following ﬁgure.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
When solving the optimization problem of the representative consumer, it is im-
p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h ed i ﬀerential part of the variational inequality is non linear due
to the presence of the term
U∗(V 0(w)) := sup
c≥0
©
U(c) − cV 0(w)
ª
As a result it is by no means trivial to verify that the value function is smooth enough to
satisfy (17) in the classical sense and standard existence theorems for classical solutions
of obstacle problems cannot be applied to our case. In order to circumvent this diﬃculty
we use an approach which was suggested by Shreve and Soner (1994). In a ﬁrst step,
we show that the central planner’s value function is concave and solves (17) in the
viscosity sense. Relying on these properties, we prove in a second step that the value
function is a classical, i.e. almost everywhere twice continuously diﬀerentiable, solution
to the obstacle problem. Finally, we establish in a third step the diﬀerent properties of
the optimal strategy discussed above. We report the details in Appendix B.
The following theorem provides a complete solution to the central planner’s problem
and constitutes our main result.
13Theorem 1 Assume that the condition of Lemma 1 hold. Then the central planner’s
value function is the unique classical solution to the obstacle problem (17) such that
V (w) ≤ V0(αw),w ∈ (0,∞).
Furthermore, the central planner’s value function is once continuously diﬀerentiable
everywhere and there exist two non negative constant wc, wi with
0 ≤ wc <w e :=
I
α − 1
<w i < ∞,
such that the central planner’s value function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable every-
where except at the point wi and
B0 := {w ∈ (0,∞):V (w)=V0(w)} =( 0 ,w c],
C := {w ∈ (0,∞):V (w) >V ∗(w)} =( wc,w i),
B1 := {w ∈ (0,∞):V (w)=V1(w)} =[ wi,∞).
Finally, the optimal exercise time and the central planner’s optimal consumption policy
prior to investment are explicitly given by
τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0:W∗











where the non negative process W∗ is the unique solution to the stochastic diﬀerential
equation (14) associated with the consumption and exercise plan (c∗,τ∗).
Proof. See Appendix B.¥
Theorem 1, which completely characterizes the central planner’s problem leads to
several insights. First, the value function of the central planner, in general, has three
regions of economic interest. The ﬁrst region, corresponding to very low wealth levels,
is one in which the growth options do not add to the welfare of the central planner. The
economy is “too poor” to beneﬁt from the existence of growth options. The second
region, where the economy has reached a wealth level that is high enough that the
presence of growth options begins to inﬂuence optimal consumption levels, but not high
enough for the economy to exercise the options. This is perhaps the economically the
14most interesting region in our model. Finally, when the wealth level is suﬃciently high,
the growth option is exercised, and the economy reverts back to the Cox, Ingersoll and
Ross (1985) economy. In addition, theorem 1 shows the manner in which the structure
of optimal consumption policy is inﬂuenced by the presence of growth options: the
current level of wealth as well as the critical level of wealth at which the option will be
exercised play a role in the optimal consumption policy, in general.
When the rate of time preference of the representative consumer is equal to zero,
his optimization problem admits a closed-form solution. According to Lemma 1, this
undiscounted optimization problem imposes stronger restrictions on the parameters of
the model. However, it also allows us to develop the intuition underlying the solution
to the general optimization problem of the consumer. In the following, we ﬁrst present
the complete solution to the undiscounted case. We then provide a numerical solution
to the discounted case that builds on the insights of the closed-form solution.
4.3 The undiscounted case
In this section, we provide a complete solution to the undiscounted optimization prob-
lem of the representative consumer. As shown in Lemma 1, the value function of the
consumer is ﬁnite if and only the marginal propensity to consume from wealth Λ is
strictly positive. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by Lemma 1 on the parameters of
the production technology depend on whether the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
is larger or smaller than one. As we show below, the value of the risk aversion coeﬃ-
cient is also essential in determining the optimal exercise time and the central planner’s
optimal consumption policy.
Proposition 1 Assume that the problem is undiscounted, that R<1 and that the





















Then we have wc =0and the optimal investment threshold is given by the unique





15Furthermore, the central planner’s value function and optimal consumption strategy
prior to investment are given by





t = V 0(W∗
t )− 1
R where the non negative process W∗ i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt ot h e
stochastic diﬀerential equation (14) associated with the pair (c∗,τ∗).
Proposition 1 shows that with zero discounting and R<1, the value function has
only two regions of economic interest: growth options always matter in this special
case. This is intuitive, as the consumer’s subjective rate of discount is zero, future
consumption possibilities are given as much weight as current consumption possibilities.
In addition, the proposition makes it clear that the optimal investment threshold is
inﬂuenced by the parameters of the technology in place (see equation (7)), the risk
aversion coeﬃcient, as well as the current wealth level. When the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion of the representative consumer is larger than one, the investment threshold
and the value function of the consumer admit simple expressions. In addition, the
central planner’s optimal consumption policy is not aﬀected by the presence of the
growth option. These results are illustrated by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 Assume that the problem is undiscounted, that R>1 and that the
conditions of Lemma 1 hold. Then the investment threshold is given by








and we have wc =0 . Furthermore, the central planner’s value function and optimal
consumption strategy prior to investment are given by




t w h e r et h en o nn e g a t i v ep r o c e s sW∗ i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o
the stochastic diﬀerential equation (14) associated with the pair (c∗,τ∗).
Proposition 2 provides the optimal investment and consumption rules for the rep-
resentative consumer when there is no discounting and R>1.A ss h o w ni nt h eP r o p o -
sition, the optimal investment threshold is independent of the parameters of the sto-
chastic process that underlie the productive technology. This is a surprising result: the
16central planner determines the exercise policy solely on the basis of information about
the growth option and risk aversion. The central planner ignores information about
the drift rate and the volatility of the assets in place. For large values of risk aversion,
the optimal investment threshold rapidly decreases and the traditional NPV rule be-
comes increasingly descriptive of the optimal investment policy (see the discussion on
investment policy below).
I nt h ea n a l y s i sb e l o w ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eR<1 to develop the intuition
to the general solution with discounting. Indeed, this case is particularly interesting
since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than 1. As a result, the
representative consumer is willing to reduce his current consumption to improve his
future consumption stream. In the discounted case, such a behavior also arises when
R>1.
4.3.1. Investment policy.
Consider ﬁrst the selected investment policy. As a in standard real options models,
the selected investment threshold wi depends on the parameters of the production
technology and the cost of investment I. However, in our setup it also reﬂects the
attitude of the representative consumer towards risk. Figure 2 plots the investment
threshold wi as a function of the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, R.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
As shown in the ﬁgure, the investment threshold decreases with risk aversion (the ﬁrst
order derivative of wi with respect to R in Proposition 2 shows that this is also the
case when R>1). To understand this feature of the model, note that before in-
vestment, the representative consumer owns the production technology and a growth
option to expand the stock of capital. By investing, the consumer transforms an as-
set with volatility Θσ into an asset with volatility σ,w h e r eΘ is the elasticity of the
growth option with respect to wealth (see section 5.2 below). Because this elasticity is
greater than one, investing in the asset reduces risk and thus improves the consumer’s
utility. This in turn provides the representative consumer with an additional beneﬁt
to investment. Because the improvement in utility increases with risk aversion, the se-
lected investment threshold decreases with risk aversion. When R>1, the investment
17threshold converges to the 0-NPV rule as risk aversion increases. That is, risk aversion
erodes the option value of waiting to invest. The concavity of the value function con-
tributes to the fact that the scale of the growth option is a relevant factor in the exercise
decision (i.e. wi depends on I even though we hold (α − 1)/I ﬁxed).
4.3.2. Optimal consumption.
In standard real options models, the investor has no choice over the consumption
stream over his life. Thus, no matter how attractive the growth option is, the investor
still consumes at the same rate δ prior to the exercise of the growth option. On
the contrary, our equilibrium model allows the consumer to choose the consumption
sequence simultaneously with the optimal exercise strategy. In the equilibrium model
without growth options, the optimal consumption rate is given by c0(W∗
t )=ΛW∗
t .
Thus, the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth is constant. In the presence
























t , 2µ<σ 2R.
This expression reveals that when the growth option is very attractive, the consumer
can reduce his rate of consumption to a level that is less than the long-run equilibrium
value to accelerate the exercise. This eﬀe c ti sd e s c r i b e di nF i g u r e3b e l o w .
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Figure 3 shows that the consumption rate relative to the long-run value dramatically
declines as the growth option goes into the money and jumps to its CIR level at when
the capital stock reaches wi. A simple examination of the dynamic budget constraint
before investment reveals that the consumer reduces his consumption to accelerate
the exercise of the growth option. In particular, for any investment threshold wi,t h e
expected time to investment decreases as consumption decreases.
4.4 The discounted case.
W h e nt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei ss t r i c t l yp o s i t i v e( ρ>0) the optimization problem
of the representative consumer cannot be solved explicitly. The approach to solve
18this problem is again by backward induction. We ﬁrst solve the general equilibrium
of the economy after the growth option is exercised. This follows directly from the
contributions of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). We then use this value function as the
boundary condition to search for the optimal exercise boundary of the consumer. The
details are reported in the Appendix.
4.4.1. Investment policy.
As in the undiscounted case, we ﬁrst analyze the selected investment policy by ex-
amining a baseline case in which the expected growth rate of the capital stock ignoring
consumption is µ =0 .15. In Table 1 below, we report the investment threshold wi
assuming that the ratio (α − 1)/I is ﬁxed at 1. The long-run marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) out of wealth is shown in parentheses. This MPC is computed using
the CIR equilibrium that prevails in our economy after the growth option is exercised.
Note that as the subjective rate of discount increases, the marginal propensity to con-
sume increases, increasing the incentive to exercise early. Thus, the growth option is
exercised sooner. The table also shows that the selected investment threshold depends
on I,e v e nt h o u g hw eh o l dt h er a t i o(α − 1)/I constant. Thus, the scale of the growth
option matters in general equilibrium.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
4.4.2. The erosion of the option value of waiting to invest.
One of the major contributions of the real options literature is to show that with
uncertainty and irreversibility, there exists a value of waiting to invest and the decision
maker should only invest when the asset value exceeds the investment cost by a poten-
tially large option premium. This eﬀect is well summarized in the survey by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994). These authors write:
“We ﬁnd that for plausible ranges of parameters, the option value [of waiting] is quan-
titatively very important. Waiting remains optimal even though the expected rate
of return on immediate investment is substantially above the interest rate or the
normal rate of return on capital. Return multiples as much as two or three times
the normal rate are typically needed before the ﬁrm will exercise its option and
make the investment.”
19In order to compare our results with the baseline model of real options, it is essential
to pin down dividend yields that are speciﬁed exogenously and adjust for the presence
of risk premium. We will set the exogenous dividend yield at the long-run marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) implied by the CIR (1985) model given the parameters
that we use in the baseline model. The issue of risk premium is fully addressed in
the general equilibrium model developed in the paper. We provide a comparison of
the optimal exercise policies with the baseline case below in Table 2. In this table, we
report the wedge of inaction β/(β − 1) when the drift rate is µ = 15%.W er e p o r ti n
parentheses, the long run MPC implied by the CIR model.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Table 2 shows that risk aversion decreases the investment threshold selected by the
manager, and hence speeds up investment. One direct implication of this result is that
risk aversion signiﬁcantly erodes the value of waiting to invest. For example, when
ρ = 12%, and σ =0 .20, the exercise occurs in the baseline model at 1.91 as opposed to
a wealth level of 1.28 in Table 1. In this example the 0—NPV investment threshold is
1. Thus the equilibrium model predicts that investment should occur when the present
value of cash ﬂows exceed the cost of investment by 28% whereas the baseline model
predicts that it should occur when the present value of cash ﬂows exceed the cost of
investment by 91%. Our analysis shows that the feedback eﬀects that growth options
have on consumption may be rather importa n tw h e nv i e w e di nt h ec o n t e x to fa na g -
gregate economy.
4.4.3. Optimal consumption.
For completeness, Figure 4 plots the optimal normalized consumption (ΛWt)−1c(Wt)
as a function of the initial wealth of the representative consumer. As in the case without
discounting, the consumption rate relative to the long-run value dramatically declines
as the growth option goes into the money. Again, as the scale of the project goes down
the eﬀect on consumption rates becomes predictably much less pronounced.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
205 Asset pricing implications
5.1 Time-varying risk aversion and interest rates
The solution to the central planner’s problem can be used to construct a competitive
equilibrium in a decentralized production economy [see e.g. Kogan (2001) for the
construction of such an equilibrium]. The pricing kernel or state price density for this
economy is given by ξt = e−ρtU0 (ct). Because the state price density is determined by
the consumption of the representative consumer, it exhibits a singularity at the time of
investment. Speciﬁcally, at the time τ of investment, the consumption rate goes back
to its long-run equilibrium value c0(W∗















R =( 1− α− 1
R)Λ(αW∗
τ − I)
where the second equality follows from the smooth pasting condition. This jump in
consumption induces a jump in the state price density given by
∆ξτ = e−ρt £








Now, assume that the value is three times continuously diﬀerentiable (it is possible
to check that this is indeed the case when ρ =0 ) and denote the equilibrium risk





we can apply Itô’s lemma to get the following result.
Proposition 3 There exists a competitive equilibrium with dynamically complete mar-
kets for the economy with growth options. In this economy, there is a singularity in the
pricing kernel and the bond price satisﬁes












t ) − 0.5Ptσ2(W∗
t )2¤
,
21and where the absolute risk aversion in wealth of the representative consumer At and












In addition, the equilibrium risk premium satisﬁes
θt = σW∗
t At.
Proposition 3 generates several interesting asset pricing implications. These impli-
cations are grouped in three categories as follows.
5.1.1. Risk aversion.
Consider ﬁrst the relative risk aversion in wealth. In the CIR economy, there is no
growth option and, under our assumptions, the relative risk aversion in wealth of the
representative consumer is constant, given by R. In our model, the relative risk aversion
decreases in a signiﬁcant manner as the wealth level increases to wi. This decrease in
RRA is due to the fact that the growth option goes more and more in the money as the
wealth level increases. A consequent action for the consumer to curtail the ﬂow rate
of consumption relative to the long-run mean rate of consumption to improve future
wealth level. Thus, we obtain time varying risk aversion by virtue of the presence of
growth option — this comes from the production side of the economy as opposed to
models in which habit formation produces time varying risk aversion to help explain
aggregate stock market behavior [see Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides (1990) and
Cochrane and Campbell (1999)]. The rate at which the RRA drops is a function of the
scale of the growth option. These eﬀe c t sa r ed e s c r i b e di nF i g u r e5b e l o w .
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
5.1.2. Risk premium and interest rates.
As in previous models, the equilibrium risk premium in our model is simply equal
to the relative risk aversion in wealth times the volatility of the growth rate of the stock
of capital. Thus, the required risk premium is higher if the representative consumer is
more risk averse and the model generates a countercyclical risk premium. In contrast
22to the CIR economy, equilibrium interest rates in an economy with growth options is
not constant but rather depends on the position of the stock of capital with respect to
the investment threshold. Again, as soon as the growth option is exercised, our econ-
omy reverts to the CIR economy and the equilibrium risk -free rate equals r0 = µ−σ2R.
5.1.3. The discounted case.
Similar results obtain in the discounted case where ρ>0. For example, we plot in
ﬁgure 6 the relative risk aversion the representative consumer as a function his wealth
for diﬀerent values of the option to expand.
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
As in the case without discounting, we ﬁnd that the relative risk aversion decreases
in a signiﬁcant manner as the wealth level increases to the investment boundary wi.
Again, we obtain time varying risk aversion in our model by virtue of the presence of
growth option. Interestingly, when the economy is on the verge of exercising a major
growth option, RRA drops much more rapidly.
5.2 Equity prices
Equity in our model is a portfolio of a long position in the stock of capital, plus a long
position in a perpetual option to expand the wealth of the economy by a factor of α at a
strike price of I. The value of this growth option depends on the optimal consumption
policy which plays the role of dividends and on the equilibrium rate which is time-
varying prior to the exercise of the growth option. An immediate consequence is that
the model will produce interesting interdependency between Tobin’s q, consumption
rates and interest rates as the growth option moves in and out of the money.
The decomposition of equity value into the value of assets in place and the value of











When there is no discounting, the value of equity can be derived in closed-form. In
particular, we have the following result.
23Proposition 4 Assume that the consumer’s utility function is undiscounted. Then,
the value of equity is given by














Proposition 4 provides the value of equity in our setup when ρ =0 . Interestingly,
when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1, the value of equity is
very similar to that derived in the baseline model. Speciﬁcally, we have






where wi is given in Proposition 2. That is, equity value is the sum of the current stock
of capital plus the value of the growth option. The value of the growth option is equal
to the product of the investment surplus and an adjustment factor that captures the
concavity of the utility function of the representative consumer. This expression also
shows that the book to market ratio exceeds one by an amount that is determined by
(i) the immediate exercise value and (ii) a “multiplier.” Moreover, the ratio of the value
o ft h eg r o w t ho p t i o nt oi t si m m e d i a t ee x e r c ise value is pinned down by the “multiplier”
which depends on the optimal consumption policy and risk aversion.
Consider next equity returns. Let ∆ denote the delta of the growth option and Γ
denote its gamma. Note that at each instant, equity returns depend on the ratio of
market to book q = E
W . In fact, a simple application of Itô’s Lemma to the function
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It is apparent from the valuation formula for equity that the delta and the gamma
of the growth option vary with its moneyness. Thus, the conditional moments of stock
returns should depend on the wealth levels as well as on the moneyness of the growth
options in the economy. In our model, equity prices are expected to increase as the
24option goes deeper in the money as does the volatility of equity price changes. That
is, an increase in stock returns due to an increase in the stock of capital W is followed
by an increase in expected returns. Thus the model generates return momentum. In
ﬁgure 7 below, we report the conditional moments of equity returns as a function of
the wealth of the representative consumer. As shown in the Figure, the moneyness of
the growth option is the key factor which determines the extent to which the book to
market ratios inﬂuence the conditional moments of equity returns.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
Sharpe ratios can also be computed for various wealth levels. In our model these
ratios will be inﬂuenced by the feedback eﬀects on interest rates as well. For the base
case CIR model the Sharpe ratio is 0.4, given the parameters chosen in the illustrations.
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
Sharpe ratio peaks at about 0.54 when the option to expand three-fold is approaching
in-the-money status and then drops rapidly as the option is about to be exercised.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of a production economy which has
a risky production technology as well as a growth option to expand the scale of the
productive sector of the economy. We show that the presence of the growth option in-
duces the consumer to curtail his consumption to improve the likelihood of investment.
This change in the optimal consumption policy is accompanied by an erosion in the
option value of waiting to invest. It also has important consequences for the evolution
of risk aversion, asset prices and equilibrium interest rates which we characterize in this
paper. In particular, we show that the reduction in consumption is accompanied by a
fall in the risk aversion in wealth of the representative consumer. Thus, risk aversion
displays time variation through the endogenous wealth dependency which arises from
the presence of growth options in the economy. This time variation in risk aversion in
turn produces a countercyclical, time varying equity risk premium. We also ﬁnd that
the moneyness of the growth option is the key factor which determines the extent to
which book to market ratios inﬂuence the conditional moments of equity returns.
25Appendix
A. Auxiliary results
In this appendix we recall some results about the central planner’s problem absent
growth options, establish Lemma 1 and provide a justiﬁcation for the application of
the dynamic programming principle which lead to (15).
In the problem absent growth options, the central planner’s wealth process has
continuous paths and its dynamics are given by
dWt = Wt (µdt + σdBt) − ctdt, W0 > 0. (21)
Let A denote the corresponding set of admissible consumption plans, that is the set of







and the solution to equation (21) is non negative throughout the inﬁnite horizon. Given
the above deﬁnitions, the central planner’s problem consists in choosing an admissible
consumption plan so as to maximize his lifetime utility. As in the main text, the
corresponding value function is denoted by








The following proposition gathers some well known facts about the value function and
the optimal strategy absent growth options and will be of repeated use in the proof of
our main results.
Proposition 5 The value function absent growth option is ﬁnite if and only if the
constant Λ deﬁned by (10) is strictly positive. In this case, we have:
a) The value function and the optimal consumption plan absent growth options are
respectively given by equations (13) and (12).
b) The value function absent growth option is strictly concave, strictly increasing
and satisﬁes DV0 =0on the positive real line.
26c) The value function absent growth options satisﬁes the dynamic programming prin-











holds for every admissible consumption plan and all pairs (ζ,θ) of stopping times
such that θ is almost surely ﬁnite.
Proof. The results of the proposition are well-known and can be found in various ref-
erences such as Fleming and Soner (1994) or Karatzas and Shreve (1999). ¥
Now consider the problem with growth options. In this case, the central planner’s
wealth experiences a jump at the time of exercise and evolves according to
Wt = W0 +
Z t
0
Ws (µds + σdBs) −
Z t
0
csds +1 {t>τ} [(α − 1)Wτ − I]. (23)
As inn the main text we denote by Θ the corresponding set of admissible consumption
and exercise plans, that is the set of pairs (τ,c) such that (22) holds and the solution
to equation (23) is non negative throughout the inﬁnite horizon. The central planner’s
problem consists in choosing an admissible consumption and exercise plan so as to
maximize his lifetime utility and the corresponding value function is denoted by








Before justifying the formal application of the dynamic programming principle which
lead to equation (15), we start by establishing the validity of Lemma 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Since the pair (τ,c) with τ = ∞ is an admissible consumption and
exercise plan for all c ∈ A we have








On other hand, consider the case where the exercise price of the growth option is zero
and let F ≥ V denote the corresponding value function. In this case, it is optimal to
exercise the option immediately and it follows that
V (W0) ≤ F(W0)=V0(αW0).
27Putting together the two previous inequalities and using the positive homogeneity of
the function V0 we deduce that the ﬁniteness of V is equivalent to that of V0 and the
desired result now follows from the ﬁrst part of Proposition 5. ¥
The last result in this section establishes some basic properties of the value function
and justiﬁes the application of the dynamic programming principle which lead to (15).
Lemma 2 Assume that the constant Λ is strictly positive, then the central planner’s
value function is increasing, concave and satisﬁes (15).
Proof.T h eﬁrst part of the statement being an easy consequence of (23) and the
properties of the utility function we omit the details and turn to the second part.
Let (c,τ) ∈ Θ denote an admissible consumption and exercise plan. Using the
continuity of the central planner’s wealth after the exercise time in conjunction with




















where the equality follows from the deﬁnition of the reward function and the fact that
Wτ+ = αWτ − I. Taking the supremum over the set Θ on both sides of the above
expression we conclude that










To establish the reverse inequality, let (τ,c) ∈ Θ be arbitrary and consider the non
negative consumption process deﬁned by
¯ ct := ct1{τ≥t} + c0
t1{τ<t}.
As is easily seen, the pair (¯ c,τ) belongs to the set Θ of admissible consumption and
exercise plans over the inﬁnite horizon and hence satisﬁes






28On the other hand, using the continuity of the central planner’s wealth after the exercise















Plugging the above expression into equation (24) and taking the supremum over the
set Θ on both sides of the resulting expression we conclude that V ≤ F holds and our
proof is complete. ¥
B. Proof of Theorem 1
In order to establish the validity of Theorem 1, we will proceed in several steps. Recall
that D denotes diﬀerential operator deﬁned by equation (16) and let
V∗(w): =m a x{V0(w),V 1(w)}
denote the obstacle above which the central planner’s value function must lie. In order
to get a handle on the central planner’s value function, and since there is no way to
ascertain its regularity a priori, we start by showing that it solves the obstacle problem
(17) in the viscosity sense.
Lemma 3 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold. Then the central planner’s
value function is a viscosity solution of the obstacle problem (17), that is
a) Supersolution: For any w0 and any twice continuously diﬀerentiable function ϕ
such that w0 is a local minimum of the function V − ϕ we have
min{ϕ(w0) − V∗(w0),Dϕ(w0)} ≥ 0.
b) Subsolution: For any w0 and any twice continuously diﬀerentiable function ϕ
such that w0 is a local maximum of the function V − ϕ we have
min{ϕ(w0) − V∗(w0),Dϕ(w0)} ≤ 0.
Proof. The proof of the above result is based on dynamic programming arguments
and Itô’s lemma. For brevity of exposition, and since a similar result can be found in
Morimoto (2003), we omit the details. ¥
29Relying on the property that the central’s planner’s value function is a concave
viscosity solution of the obstacle problem (15), we can now establish that it is in fact
continuously diﬀerentiable.
Lemma 4 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold. Then the value function of
the central planner is continuously diﬀerentiable on (0,∞).
Proof. Since the central planner’s value function is concave and increasing, its left and
right derivatives V 0
−(w) and V 0
+(w) exist and satisfy
0 ≤ V 0
−(w) ≤ V+(w),w ∈ (0,∞).
Now, suppose that it is not continuously diﬀerentiable so that the above inequality is
strict for some w0.L e tk ∈ [V 0
−(w0),V0
+(w0)] be arbitrary, ﬁx a strictly positive ε and
consider the twice continuously diﬀerentiable function




Using the concavity of the value function, we easily deduce that the point w0 is a local
maximum of the function V − ϕε and since V ≥ V∗ by deﬁnition, it follows from the
viscosity subsolution property of the value function that




− U∗(k) ≤ 0.
Choosing ε small enough leads to a contradiction and establishes the continuous dif-
ferentiability of the central planner’s value function. ¥
As in the text, let C denote the set of points where the central planner’s value
function lies strictly above the obstacle, that is
C := {w ∈ (0,∞):V (w) >V ∗(w)},
and let B := (0,∞)\C denote the set of points where it coincides with the obstacle.
The next lemma establishes some basic properties of C.
Lemma 5 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold true, then there are non neg-
ative constants wc <I/ (α − 1) := we <w i ≤∞such that C =( wc,w i).
30Proof. Using the concavity of the central planner’s value function it is easily deduced
that C is a convex and open subset of (0,∞).I tf o l l o w st h a tw eh a v eC =( wc,w i) for
some positive wc <w i < ∞. In order to show that wc ≤ we ≤ wi and thus complete
the proof, assume that it is not the case. Then it follows from the deﬁnition of C that
we have we ∈ int(B) which, together with the deﬁnition of the obstacle, contradicts the
continuous diﬀerentiability of the central planner’s value function. ¥
Using the deﬁnition of the set B in conjunction with the above result, we have that
the state space can be decomposed as B0 ∪ C ∪ B1 where
B0 :={w>0:V (w)=V0(w)} =( 0 ,w c],
B1 :={w>0:V (w)=V1(w)} =[ wi,∞).
In particular, since we / ∈ int(B) we have that the central planner’s value function is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable on (0,w c)∪(wi,∞) and all there remains to establish
in order to prove that the central planner’s value function is a classical solution of the
obstacle problem is that it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the set C. This is the
content of the next lemma.
Lemma 6 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold, then the central planner’s
value function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the set C ∪ B0 =( 0 ,w i)
Proof.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of C in conjunction with the fact that the value function is
viscosity solution of the obstacle problem, it is easily deduced that V is also a viscosity
solution of the equation
Dϕ(w)=0 ,w ∈ C =( wc,w i). (25)
Since the central planner’s value function is once continuously diﬀerentiable on the
strictly positive real line, the function deﬁned by
h(w): =ρV (w) − µwV 0(w) − U∗(V 0(w))
is continuous on C.N o w , ﬁx an arbitrary real number ε and consider the ordinary
second order diﬀerential equation
−1
2σ2w2ϕ00
ε(w)+h(w) − ε =0 , (26)
31Let ( ˇ w, ˆ w) with ˇ w ≤ we ≤ ˆ w be a non degenerate open interval contained in C and, for













ϕε(w): =V ( ˇ w)+θε(w)+( w − ˇ w)
µ
V (ˆ w) − V ( ˇ w)+θε(ˆ w)
ˆ w − ˇ w
¶
.
Then ϕε is a classical solution of equation (26) on the set O := ( ˇ w, ˆ w) and is equal to
the central planner’s value function on the boundary of this set. In order to compare
the functions V and ϕε we use the fact that the central planner’s value function is
a viscosity solution of equation (25). Assume that ε is strictly positive and that the
function V − ϕε has a a local maximum at some point w0 ∈ O. Then the viscosity




which contradicts the fact that ϕε is a solution to equation (26) on the set O.T h u s ,
the function V − ϕε attains its maximum over cl(O) at the boundary of this set and,
since it is equal to zero there, it follows that we have
V (w) ≤ ϕε(w),w ∈ cl(O).
Letting ε decrease to zero on both sides we conclude that V ≤ ϕ0 on O. Similarly,
letting ε be negative and using the fact that the central planner’s value function is
a viscosity supersolution of (25) we obtain that ϕ0 ≤ V holds and conclude that
the function V = ϕ0 is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the set O.F r o m t h e
arbitrariness of the constants ˇ w and ˆ w it is now clear that the central planner’s value
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the set C.
In order to complete the proof it is suﬃcient to show that the central planner’s
value function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable at the point wc. This easily follows
from the continuous diﬀerentiability of V and the fact that the value function absent
growth options satisﬁes DV0 =0on the positive real line, we omit the details. ¥
Putting together the results of Lemma 1—3, 5 and 6 we have proved that the value
function is a classical, concave solution of the obstacle problem (17) such that
ϕ(w) ≤ V0(αw),w ∈ (0,∞). (27)
32In order to show that it is in fact the unique such solution of the obstacle problem, we
will rely on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 7 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold true, let ϕ be a classical,






and denote by wϕ >w e the investment threshold associated with the function ϕ.T h e n ,
for any initial condition in the interval (0,w ϕ), the stochastic diﬀerential equation
Wt = W0 +
Z t
0
1{Ws<wϕ} [(µWs − cϕ(Ws))ds + σWsdZs] (28)
admits a unique, non exploding solution which is positive and strictly positive if the
central planner’s relative risk aversion is larger than one.
Proof. Since the function ϕ is a classical solution of the obstacle problem, it is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable on the set
H := (0,w ϕ)={w : ϕ(w) >V 1(w)} ∪ {w : ϕ(w)=V0(w)}
and it follows that cϕ is locally Lipschitz continuous when restricted to the set H.O n
the other hand, using (27) in conjunction with the fact that ϕ ≥ V0, l’Hopital’s rule





Since the function cϕ is locally Lipschitz continuous when restricted to H and the
coeﬃcients the stochastic diﬀerential equation are equal to zero on the boundary of
this set, it follows from standard results that (28) admits a unique strong solution
which is absorbed upon reaching the boundary of the set H.
If the investment threshold is ﬁnite, then the solution is obviously non exploding, so
assume that wϕ = ∞. Using the non negativity of cϕ in conjunction with standard
comparison theorems for solutions of stochastic diﬀerential equations we deduce that
Wt ≤ W0






,t ∈ (0,∞). (29)
33The process on the right hand side being a geometric Brownian motion, it is almost
everywhere ﬁnite and it follows that the solution to (28) is non exploding.
Let T0 denote the ﬁrst time that the solution hits the origin and deﬁne another stopping
time by setting S := τϕ ∧ T0. In order to complete the proof we need to show that, in
the case where the central planner’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is strictly larger
than one, the event
∆ := {T0 < ∞} = {ω ∈ Ω : ∃t ∈ (0,∞) s.t. Wt =0 }
has zero measure. Using the fact that the function ϕ is a classical solution to the
obstacle problem in conjunction with the second assertion of Proposition 5 we obtain





is a local martingale. If the relative risk aversion of the central planner is strictly larger
than one, then the functions (V0,U) are both negative and since ϕ satisﬁes equation (27)
we conclude that the local martingale Y is negative, and hence a global submartingale










where the second inequality follows from equation (27) and the fact that S = T0 holds
almost surely on A. Since the left hand side of the above expression is ﬁnite and the
value function absent growth options equals −∞ at zero we conclude that ∆ is a null
set and our proof is complete. ¥
Lemma 8 Assume that the conditions of Lemma 1 hold true and let the function ϕ be








where the stopping time τϕ is the ﬁrst time that the solution to equation (28) reaches
the strictly positive investment threshold wϕ := inf{w : ϕ(w)=V1(w)}.
Proof. In order to establish the desired result, we start by showing that the local
martingale deﬁned by (30) is a uniformly integrable martingale. Using equation (27)
34in conjunction with the fact that ϕ ≥ V0 it is easily deduced that Y is either always
positive or always negative. Fatou’s lemma thus implies that












and, since the left hand side of the above expression is ﬁnite, Lebesgues’s dominated





is uniformly integrable. Now consider the process deﬁned by A := Y − B.U s i n gt h e
assumptions of the lemma in conjunction with (29), it is easily deduced that















holds for some strictly positive constant β where the last equality follows from the ﬁrst
assertion of Proposition 5, Itô’s lemma and equation (10). The marginal propensity
to consume being strictly positive, D is uniformly integrable and it follows that A is
uniformly integrable. The local martingale Y being the sum of two uniformly integrable
process it is a uniformly integrable martingale. In particular,














and all that remains to establish is that
lim
t→∞




Consider the integral term ﬁrst and assume that the central planner’s relative risk
aversion is smaller than one for otherwise the desired result follows from Lemma 7. By
deﬁnition of the stopping time S we have





35and using the fact that the solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (28) is equal
to zero on [[T0,∞[[ in conjunction with the fact that U(0) = 0 when the central planner’s
relative risk aversion is smaller than one, we conclude that BS = Bτϕ.
Now consider the process A. Using the result of Lemma 7 in conjunction with the
assumptions of the statement it is easily deduced that
lim
t→∞
At =1 {S<∞}AS +l i m
t→∞
1{S=∞}At =1 {τϕ<∞}Aτϕ +l i m
t→∞
1{S=∞}At.
Using equation (31) in conjunction with the fact that a geometric Brownian motion
with negative drift converges to zero, we obtain that the last term on the right hand
side of the above expression is equal to zero and it follows that (32) holds. ¥
As explained after the statement of Theorem 1, the optimal investment strategy
consists in exercising the growth option as soon as the central planner’s wealth enters
the region B1 =[ wi,∞). The following result shows that the investment threshold wi
is ﬁnite and hence that there always exists an optimal exercise time.
Corollary 1 Assume that all the conditions of Lemma 7 hold true, then wϕ is ﬁnite.
In particular, the central planner’s investment threshold is ﬁnite.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that the investment threshold wϕ is inﬁnite.
Since the solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (28) is non explosive this






The function ϕ being either always positive or always negative depending on the sign
of the utility function, this implies that cϕ ∈ A and it follows that ϕ ≤ V0.S i n c e
the set of points where V0 <V 1 is non empty, this contradicts the assumptions of the
statement and hence completes our proof. ¥
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 1, all there remains to establish is the
optimality of the pair (c∗,τ∗) and the fact that the central planner’s value function
is the unique classical, concave solution of the obstacle problem such that (27) holds.
This is the content of the following veriﬁcation lemma.
36Lemma 9 Assume that ϕ is a classical, concave solution to the obstacle problem such




t ),τ ∗ := τϕ =i n f{t : W∗
t = wϕ}.
where the process W∗ denotes the corresponding solution to the stochastic diﬀerential
equation (23). Then the function ϕ coincides with the central planner’s value function
and the admissible consumption and exercise plan (c∗,τ∗) is optimal.
P r o o fo fL e m m a9 . Let the function ϕ satisfy the assumptions of the statement, ﬁxa n





where the process W is the solution to (23) associated with the pair (c,τ).U s i n gI t ô ’ s
lemma in conjunction with the that the function ϕ is a classical solution of the obstacle
problem we obtain that the process G is a local supermartingale. On the other hand,
using the fact that ϕ ≥ V0 in conjunction with the third assertion of Proposition 5 and
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holds for some constant Γ. Since the consumption plan c satisﬁes (22) the process on
the right hand side of the above expression is a uniformly integrable martingale and it

















Using the assumptions of the statement in conjunction with an argument similar to










37where the last equality follows from the fact that a geometric Brownian motion with
negative drift converges to zero. Plugging this back into equation (33) and using the








Taking the supremum with respect to the set of admissible consumption and exercise
plans on both sides of the above expression we conclude that ϕ ≥ V .
In order to establish the reverse inequality, assume that the central planner’s initial
wealth lies in (0,w ϕ) for otherwise the result is immediate. Since W∗ coincides with
the unique solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (28) up to the exercise time,

















where the second equality is a consequence of equation (23), the deﬁnition of the
function V1 and the optimality of c0 for the problem absent growth options. The left
hand side of the above expression being ﬁnite, we have that the pair (c∗,τ∗) belongs to
the set Θ of admissible plans and it follows that ϕ ≤ V . In conjunction with the ﬁrst
part, this implies that ϕ coincides with central planner’s value function and establishes
the optimality of the pair (c∗,τ∗). ¥
B. Proof of Propositions 2 and 1
In order to establish the validity of Theorem 2, all there is to prove is that the value
function given in the statement is a classical, concave solution of the obstacle problem
such that equation (27) holds. For brevity of exposition, and since this follows from
straightforward algebraic computations, we omit the details.
38References
Berk, Jonathan, Richard Green, and Vasant Naik, “Optimal Investment, Growth
Options and Security Returns,” Journal of Finance 54, 1999, 1153-1607.
Campbell, John, and John Cochrane, “By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based
Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy
107, 1999, 205-251.
Casassus, Jaime, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Brian Routledge, “Equilibrium Com-
modity Prices with Irreversible Investment and Non-Linear Technologies,” Work-
ing Paper, University of California Berkeley, 2004.
Constantinides, George , “Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium
Puzzle,” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1990, 519-543.
Cooper, Ilan, “Asset Pricing Implications of Non-Convex Adjustment Costs and Irre-
versibility of Investment,” Journal of Finance,F o r t h c o m i n g .
Cox, John, John Ingersoll and Steven Ross, “An Intertemporal General Equilibrium
M o d e lo fA s s e tP r i c i n g , ”Econometrica 53, 1985, 363-384.
Cox, John, John Ingersoll and Steven Ross, “A Theory of the Term Structure of
Interest Rates,” Econometrica 53, 1985, 385-407.
Dixit, Avinash and Robert Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Fleming, Wendel and Mete H. Soner, 1998, Controlled Markov Processes and Viscosity
Solutions, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Gomes, Joao, Leonid Kogan, and Lu Zhang, “Equilibrium Cross Section of Returns”,
Journal of Political Economy 111, 2003, 693-732.
Hubbard, Glenn, “Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One’s Options Open,”
Journal of Economic Literature 32, 1994, 1816-1831.
Jermann, Urban, “Asset Pricing in a Production Economy,” Journal of Monetary
Economics 41, 1998, 257-275.
39Karatzas, Ioannis, and Steven E. Shreve, 1999, Methods of Mathematical Finance,
Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Kogan, Leonid, “An Equilibrium Model of Irreversible Investment,” Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 62, 2001, 201-245.
Kydland, Finn, and Edward Prescott, “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,”
Econometrica 50, 1982, 1345-1370.
Lucas, Robert, “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica 46, 1978, 1429-
1445.
McDonald, Robert, and Daniel Siegel, “The Value of Waiting to Invest”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 101, 1986, 707-728.
Merton, Robert, “The theory of rational option pricing,” Bell Journal of Economics
4, 1973, 141-183.
Merton, Robert, “Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous Time
Model”, Journal of Economic Theory 3, 1971, 373-413.
Morimoto, Hiroaki, “Variational inequalities for combined control and stopping,”
SIAM Journal on Control & Optimization 42, 2003, 686-708.
Rubinstein, Mark, “The Valuation of Uncertain Income Streams and the Pricing of
Options,” Bell Journal of Economics 7, 1976, 407-425.
Rubinstein, Mark, “Securities Market Eﬃciency in an Arrow-Debreu Economy,” Amer-
ican Economic Review 65, 1975, 812-824.
Sundaresan, Suresh, “Intertemporally Dependent Preferences and the Volatility of
Consumption and Wealth,” Review of Financial Studies 2, 1989, 73-89.
Wang, Tan, “Equilibrium with New Investment Opportunities,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 25, 2001, 1751-1773.
40Table 1: Investment policy in general equilibrium. This table reports the
selected investment threshold W∗ assuming that the ratio (α − 1)/I is ﬁxed at 1. The
long-run marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wealth is shown in parentheses.
This MPC is computed using the CIR equilibrium that prevails in our economy after
t h eg r o w t ho p t i o ni se x e r c i s e d .
Table 1 σ =0 .15 σ =0 .20 σ =0 .25
ρ = 10% 1.282 (11.375%) 1.309 (10.50%) 1.346 ( 9.375%)
I =2 ρ = 12% 1.244 (12.375%) 1.275 (11.50%) 1.303 (10.375%)
ρ = 14% 1.213 (13.375%) 1.248 (12.50%) 1.278 (11.375%)
ρ = 10% 1.320 (11.375%) 1.363 (10.50%) 1.414 ( 9.375%)
I =1 .1 ρ = 12% 1.269 (12.375%) 1.316 (11.50%) 1.357 (10.375%)
ρ = 14% 1.199 (14.375%) 1.279 (12.50%) 1.3224 (11.375%)
Table 2: Investment policy in partial equilibrium. This table reports the se-
lected investment threshold W∗ in the baseline model of real options that ignore the
feedback eﬀects of investment on equilibrium quantities [such as consumption] and
wealth-dependent risk aversion. Again, we assume that the ratio (α − 1)/I is ﬁxed at
1. The long-run marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is shown in parentheses.
Table 2 σ =0 .15 σ =0 .20 σ =0 .25
ρ = 10% 1.934 (11.38%) 2.432 (10.50%) 3.309 (9.38%)
ρ = 12% 1.600 (12.38%) 1.907 (11.50%) 2.362 (10.38%)
ρ = 14% 1.432 (13.38%) 1.248 (12.50%) 1.963 (11.38%)
ρ = 16% 1.333 (14.38%) 1.511 (13.50%) 1.744 (12.38%)
41Figure 1: State space of the optimal consumption and investment plans.
The growth option has positive NPV for all w ≥ we. In the continuation region [wi,∞),i t


























Figure 2: Selected investment threshold. Figure 2 plots the selected investment
threshold as a function of the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient R.I nt h i sﬁgure we have ρ =0 ,
µ =0 .01,and σ =0 .5. The solid line represents an environment in which I =1 .4.T h ed a s h e d
line represents an environment in which I =2 .
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42Figure 3: Consumption rate when ρ =0 . Figure 3 plots the consumption rate as
af u n c t i o no fw e a l t h i nt h eC I Re c o n o m y( t o pl i n e )a n di nt h ee c o n o m yw i t hg r o w t ho p t i o n s
(bottom curve). In this ﬁgure we haveρ =0 , µ =0 .01, σ =0 .5, R =0 .5 and wi=2 .23.

































Figure 4: Consumption rate when ρ>0. Figure 4 plots the consumption rate as
af u n c t i o no fw e a l t h i nt h eC I Re c o n o m y( t o pl i n e )a n di nt h ee c o n o m yw i t hg r o w t ho p t i o n s
(bottom curve). In this ﬁgure we have ρ =0 .10, µ =0 .10, σ =0 .2,a n dR =2and wi=1 .81.
























43Figure 5: Relative risk aversion in wealth when ρ =0 . Figure 5 plots the relative
risk aversion in wealth as a function of wealth. In this ﬁgure we have set the input parameters
as follows: ρ =0 , µ =0 .01, σ =0 .5,a n dR =0 .5 and we have wi=2 .23.































Figure 6: Scaled relative risk aversion in wealth when ρ>0. Figure 6 plots
the relative risk aversion in wealth as a function of wealth. In this ﬁgure we have set the input
parameters as follows: ρ =0 .10, µ =0 .10, σ =0 .2,a n dR =2and we have wi=1 .81.






























44Figure 7: Conditional moments of equity returns when ρ>0. Figure 7 plots
the conditional moments of equity returns in the model with growth options. In this ﬁgure
we have set the input parameters as follows: ρ =0 .1, µ =0 .1,a n dσ =0 .2 and we have
wi=1 .81.






































































45Figure 8: Sharpe ratio when ρ>0. Figure 8 plots the Sharpe ratio in the model with
growth options. In this ﬁgure we have set the input parameters as follows: ρ =0 .1, µ =0 .1,
and σ =0 .2. For the base case CIR model the Sharpe ratio is 0.4.
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